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COMBINED
MILITARY
INTERROGATION REPORT
CENTER

Additional requirements for levy on subject source
should be relayed immediately to MACV I2, IOD
referencing CMIC source number 1828

COUNTRY: RVN

SUBJECT: VC attack on US Embassy, SAIGON (31 Jan 68)

DATE OF INFORMATION: CMIC, SAIGON

EVALUATION: SOURCE C INFORMATION

SOURCE: Captive NGUYEN VAN SAU (NGUYENX, VEAN SAUS), aka CHUC (CHUWCS);
CMIC # 1828

REPORT NUMBER: US 382-68

DATE OF REPORT: 26 Feb 68

NUMBER OF PAGES: Five (5)

REFERENCES: MACV ICP; Map: VIETNAM, AMS Series L701h, Sheet 6231-II,
Edt 1965, Scale: 1:50,000

PREPARED BY: T L MORAN, SSG, US Army

SUMMARY: This report contains information concerning sapper training and
the attack on the US Embassy, SAIGON, by members of the C-10 Bn, on 31 Jan
68, as provided by captive NGUYEN VAN SAU, a former member of the C-10 Bn.
Source was captured on 31 Jan 68.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
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1. Induction by the VC.

In May 1964, a group of armed VC surrounded source's village, TAN HOA Ham, VINH LOC Vil, TAN BINH Dist, GIA DINH Prov, SVN and forced approx 20 young men in the village to accompany them. The 20 men, including source, did not want to go with the VC, but the VC tied their hands and kept them under armed guard. The men were taken to LOC THUAN Vil, TRANG BANG Dist, TAY NINH Prov, vic (XTM20172). LOC THUAN Vil was a regrouping station for approx 150 VC inductees who were waiting to move to training areas.

2. Basic Training.

In July 1964, source and two other inductees traveled to PHU HOA Ham, MY HUNG Vil, CU CHI Dist GIA DINH Prov to receive basic military training (exact location unknown). At PHU HOA Ham source was a common soldier in the B-60 Unit (platoon size), which was comprised of approx 30 men. The B-60 Unit was directly subordinate to MR4.

3. Reasons for Remaining with the VC.

During Jul 64, source decided to remain with the VC and fight with them until the war was over. Living and fighting with the VC was much more difficult than the relatively easy life at home in his village. His major complaint about living with the VC was that he did not receive enough food. Despite these hardships, source remained with the VC because most of the other young men from his and nearby villages were VC members and endured their hardships. Nearly everyone in source's unit was of the same age and background as he, and this gave source a secure feeling that he was doing what was right.

4. Qualifications.

There were no qualifications necessary to join the VC. The VC preferred, however, to recruit mostly young and healthy men. A minority of the men joined the VC voluntarily, but the majority of new members were forced to fight with the VC. Source was never told what his term of enlistment was, but he presumed it to be until the war was over. He did not sign enlistment papers and was given no VC identification. There were no women in the VC units in this area, and source had also never heard of the VC attempting to recruit ARVN prisoners. There were many regroupes in source's units, and they were usually in positions of importance. He never came into contact with North Vietnamese soldiers.

5. Political Training.

Source received two or three days of political training every two or three months for the entire time he was with the VC. The only subject he was lectured on was the war in South VIETNAM. He was told that the VC would fight in South VIETNAM until they were victorious, regardless of how many of their men were killed. Before he was captured, source felt that the VC would win the war because, during the political lectures, he was told that the VC outnumbered the allies and could win. After he came to SAIGON and was captured, source thought that the political lectures were not true and that the allies had enough men to win the war. The VC objective in the fighting was to bring peace to South VIETNAM.

6. Sapper Training.

In Sep 65, source was transferred to the 4th Squad, 2d Platoon, 1st Company, C-10 Infantry Bn. (Interrogator's Comments: When asked if

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the C-10 was a Sapper Bn, source stated that they trained in Many subjects, including sapper, but were known as the C-10 Infantry Bn.) from Sep 65, source and 90 or 100 other men received sapper training while assigned to the C-10 Inf Bn at PHU HOA Ham. The training was conducted in an open area outside the hamlet by the assistant company commander, NAM VAN (NAM VAN). The training covered the following subjects:

a. Crawling.

Source was taught how to crawl over rocky and other difficult terrain without making any noise. This training prepared him for crawling up to the perimeter of an enemy post to plant explosive charges. He was trained to crawl on the ground and feel with his hands for grenades or trip wires. He also received practice in crawling under barbed wire.

b. Explosives.

Source received limited training with TNT and C-4 explosives. He learned how to attach the fuse to the parcel of explosives. No further details.

c. Source was taught two methods of scaling a wall.

The first method was accomplished by one person standing on another's shoulders and climbing over the wall. If the wall were too high for this method, they would then use a rope with a three pronged hook at its end to snag the top of the wall.

d. Miscellaneous.

Source's unit received very limited training in swimming, construction of small wooden foot bridges and how to avoid flares.

7. From Jan 66 to Aug 66, source was assigned as a squad leader of the B-10 Unit (platoon size), C-10 Inf Bn, which was located at RANG Ham, Vil unknown, CU CHI Dist, GIA DINH Prov (exact location unknown). Source's job was to supervise the courriers in the transporting of messages from B-10, which was redesignated J-6, to J-9, J-4, J-5 and other small units within the C-10 Bn. The messages were always sealed; source had no knowledge of their contents. The only mission of the B-10 was to construct its own living quarters. Source had no knowledge of the mission of the C-10 Inf Bn. Source was never engaged in combat while assigned to the B-10 Unit.

8. From Aug 66 to 27 Jan 68, source was in charge of delivering messages for the Finance Office of the C-10 Bn located at THANH AN Vil, DAU TIENG Dist, BINH DUONG Prov, SVN. Seven men worked for source delivering the messages. The contents were unknown, since the messages were always sealed. The C-10 Inf Bn engaged in several small attacks and ambushes between Aug 66 and Jan 68, but source was unable to provide details.

9. Attack on United States Embassy, SAIGON:

a. Personnel Involved.

On 28 Jan 68, source was told by his section leader, BA SUONG (BA SUONG), to go on an unknown mission with his Company Commander, BA DAN (BA DAN), aka BA DEN (BA DEN), and five other men: DUC (DUC), GIANG (GIANG), TEQ (TEQ), VAN (VAN) and VINH (VINH). Source was given no other details at this time. He had known all the previously mentioned individuals

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for approx one year since they were all members of the C-10 Inf Bn. BA DAN, GIANG, TEO, VAN and source had all received at least three months of sapper training but DUC and VINH were office workers and had had no sapper training.

b. Transportation.

On 28 Jan 68, the seven men left THANH AN Vil for SAIGON in a civilian truck which BA DAN had borrowed from an unknown source. The men carried with them only extra civilian clothing. They did not stop along the way to pick up or drop anyone off, nor did they stop to spend the night anywhere.

c. Staging Area.

At 2000 hours, on 29 Jan 68, the group arrived in SAIGON. They drove directly to a house in DAKAO, SAIGON. Source entered and left the house when it was dark, so he did not know the house number. He was not allowed to go outside while he stayed at the house. He would not be able to find the house again, as this was the first time he had ever been to SAIGON. The house next door was occupied by Koreans (further details unknown). BA DAN knew the house number and the location of the house. South Vietnamese civilian family of unknown size lived in the house. The husband was gone from the house for the entire time source was there, so they never saw each other. The children were kept in a different room. The wife was 40 years old, 40 to 45 kilo in weight, light complexion, 1.58m tall, and long curly hair. Source was forbidden to talk to her, and did not know the names of any of the occupants of the house. At 2200 hours on 30 Jan 68, eight VC entered the house and stayed until time to depart for the attack. Their names were: BAY TIEN (BAYR TIEN), CHINH (CHINES), TAI (TAIL), BAY QUYEN (BAYR QUYEN), DUONG (DUONG), THANH (THANHL), UT NHO (UTS NHO), and the name of the eighth man was unknown. BAY TIEN and UT NHO were chief and asst chief, respectively of the Combat Section, C-10 Inf Bn. They were assistant chiefs of the embassy attack force. BA DAN was in charge of the attack. All of the eight men were sapper trained and were from the C-10 Inf Bn.

d. Weapons.

On the evening of 30 Jan 68, BA DAN left the house, picked up weapons for the entire group from an unknown source, and returned to the house in a civilian truck. The following weapons were used for the attack: seven AK-47s, six pistols of US and North Vietnamese origin (caliber unknown), two B-40 ATGLs, 30 kg of C-4 explosives, 120 rifle rounds per man, 10 B-40 rounds, and an unknown number of pistol rounds. The AK-47s were relatively new; the B-40s were old and well worn.

e. Mission.

Source did not know why he was told to come to SAIGON until 2400 hours on 30 Jan 68 when the weapons were passed out. He was then told that he was going to participate in the attack on the US Embassy. The mission of the attack force was to overrun the embassy compound, enter the embassy building and hold it for 36 hours. After 36 hours, BA DAN was to order a withdrawal. Source did not know what the leaders of the attack force planned to accomplish after they entered the embassy building. Source did not know why they were to attack the embassy, and he considered that target to be unimportant. He did not know how many guards were at the embassy. His instructions were to shoot the embassy guards if they resisted the attack force, however, if the guards surrendered they were to be taken

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prisoner. Source did not expect to live through the attack, nor did he think that the attack force would overrun the embassy.

f. At 0230 hours, 31 Jan 68, the 15 man attack force left the house. They were wearing white or blue shirts and black or blue trousers. Red armbands, with no identifying numbers were worn on the left arm, and blue, white and light yellow checked handkerchiefs were worn around their necks. They rode in one taxicab and one civilian truck to a spot approx 40 meters from the front of the embassy building. Source knew nothing of the drivers of the vehicles or where the vehicles were obtained. He saw no other VC, ARVN or US soldiers positioned around the embassy.

g. Attack.

An electrically detonated charge of C-4 explosives was immediately set off against the embassy compound wall approx 120 meters to the right of the front gate. The explosion knocked a hole in the wall large enough for a man to crawl through. Several B-40 rounds were fired by the attack squad from outside the wall to the upper floors of the embassy building. All 15 men entered the compound through the hole at 0300 hours. Source was the twelfth or thirteenth man to crawl through the hole. After they entered the compound, the members of the attack force crouched behind large shrubbery pots which were located throughout the compound. Within five minutes after the VC entered the compound, American MPs positioned themselves on rooftops of nearby houses and fired into the compound at the VC, killing an unknown number of them. This action lasted two or three hours. The VC were unable to enter the embassy building because it was impractical to use the B-40 ATGL, as the round would go through the door, but would not knock it down. The attack force theorized that the B-40 round, if used, would explode inside the embassy building, create a fire, and would burn the entire building down. Source did not know why BA DAN disapproved of burning the building, or what he planned to look for inside. American guards positioned on the second or higher floors of the embassy building shot four or five members of the attack force in the early stage of the battle. Source was wounded at approx 0310 hours on the morning of the attack. From the time he was wounded until 0700 that morning, he intermittently lapsed into states of unconsciousness, and could provide few details of what happened during this time. At 0700, source regained consciousness and found that he was lying next to a shrub pot. Source saw several Americans walking about the compound and noticed seven or eight dead VC lying on the ground around him. Source knew of two American Guards killed in the attack. Every member of the attack force was either killed or wounded. BA DAN was still alive after the attack, but source does not know what happened to his two assistants, BAY TIEN and UT NHO.

(Interrogator's Comments: Source received four wounds during the morning of the attack. One wound is on the left cheek bone and may have been caused by a fall or perhaps a round. He has several scratches on his right elbow, and a bullet wound in his left upper arm. Source and this interrogator are of the opinion that the slug is still lodged in his arm. The fourth wound was a round in his right buttocks. Source was quite certain that the leader of the attack force, BA DAN, lived through the attack, and was subsequently taken to CMIC, SAIGON. If BA DAN could be located and interrogated, he should be able to provide detailed information on the planning, staging area, and the mission of the 31 Jan 68 attack on the US Embassy, SAIGON.)

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NACV JOINT MESSAGEFORM

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TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	
TYPE TRANSMISSION	TO	INFO	
ELECTRICAL	X		
AIR MAIL			
COURIER			X

2053B
MA 20
046 1440



PRECEDENCE
ACTION TO: PRIORITY
INFO ROUTINE

DTG 151425Z FEB 68

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

C/S	SJS	NISS
	X 8	X 1
J1	J2	C118
X 4	X 2	
J3	J4	X 3
X 1		
J5	J6	X 2
X 1		
ACTIV	NAG	X 30
AFOP	NAVFORV	
CIED	OICC	
X-1		
AMEMB/CSA	PM	
X 1		
AMEMB PO	SJA	
X 1		
AMEMB	SOG	
AME X 3	X 1	
COC	SURG	
X 2		
COMB	TMA	
STUDIES X 1		
COMPT	NIC	
	X-1	
DDO SPEC	USAID	
REP	X 3	
OSD/ARPA	USARV	
RDFU-V	X 15	
MACJ233	11 FFV LNO	
X-1	X 1	
MACJ26	11 FFV LNO	
X-1	X 3	
MACJ204	111 MAFLNO	
X-1	X 1	
JUSPAO	CDEC	
X 2		
J2 LNO	X-1	
JUSPAO	7TH AF	
X 2	X 10	
MACJ287	525th MI	
X-1	Gp X-1	
MACJ265	CMD (02)	
X-1	X 2	
CMIC	CICV	
A-9	X-15	

FROM: COMUSMACV SAIGON
 TO: CINCPAC RUHHHQA
 DIA RUEPJS
 DIRNSA RUEPWS
 STATE DEPT WASH DC RUEHC
 CIA RUEPIA
 DA/ACSI RUEPWD
 COMNAVINTCOM RUENAAA
 CSAF/AFNIN RUEFHQA
 CINCUSARPAC RUHHRGA
 CINCPACFLT RUHHBRA
 CINCPACAF RUHHABA
 COMUSMACTHAI RUMOTLA
 1127TH USAFFLDACTYGP FT BELVOIR VA RUEFHQA
 CNO/DNI/STIC (RUENAAA)
 FTD WPAFB OHIO RUELFIF
 6499TH SP ACTY GP HICKAM AFB HAWAII (RUHHABA)
 INFO CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG 2
 CG II FFORCEV LONG BINH 2

TYPED NAME TITLE PHONE AND OFFICE SYMBOL
 CASIMIR I LENARD
 LTC, USA
 Director, US Element CMIC

SIGNATURE
 PHILLIP B. DAVIDSON, JR, BG, USA
 ACoFS, J-2

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CG III MAF DA NANG 8

SA USAAG IV CTZ CAN THO 2

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FR MACJ-263

CINCPAC FOR J2, DIRNSA FOR B6, CIA FOR RSB/CGS, DA/ACSI FOR
DFIRE, CINCUSARPAC FOR G2, COMUSMACTHAI FOR J2, FTD FOR TDARM.

SUBJ: Knowledgeability Brief (KB)

Suspense for sbm of sp rqr:

a. In country: 19 Feb 68

b. All others: 26 Feb 68

1. (C) Biographical Data:

a. NGUYEN VAN SAU (NGUYENX VEAN SAUS) CMIC Con No 1828.

b. CHUC (CHUWCS)

c. Sqd Ldr.

d. Admin Section, C-10 Sapper Bn.

e. 1937, DINH LOT Vil, TAN BINH Dist, GIA DINH Prov,

RVN.

f. Same as POB.

g. ½ yr.

h. None.

i. Single.

j. 3½ yrs.

k. None.

l. None.

m. Buddhist.

2. (C) Circumstances of Capture:

a. 31 Jan 68

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b. American Embassy, SAIGON, RVN.

c. US Forces.

d. One (1) AK rifle.

3. (C) Past Activities:

1937 - Apr 64: Lived and worked in POB.

May 64 - Jul 64: Joined VC and received basic infantry training at PHU HOA Vil, CU CHI Dist, HAU NGHIA Prov, RVN.

Aug 64 - Aug 65: Assigned to B-60 Plat, C-10 Sapper Bn, located in CU CHI Dist, HAU NGHIA Prov, RVN.

Sep 65 - Dec 65: Transferred to 4th Sqd, 2d Plat, C-10 Sapper Bn, located in CU CHI Dist, HAU NGHIA Prov, RVN, and received three months advanced infantry and sapper training.

Dec 65 - Jun 66: Assigned as Sqd Ldr to B-10 Sqd, C-10 Sapper Bn, located in CU CHI, HAU NGHIA Prov, RVN.

Jul 66 - 26 Jan 68: Assigned as Sqd Ldr to the Admin Section, C-10 Sapper Bn, located in DAU TIEN Dist, BINH DUONG Prov, RVN.

26 Jan 68 - 30 Jan 68: Source rode by bus to SAIGON and stayed at a house in DAKAO (SAIGON), RVN.

31 Jan 1968: Participated in attack on the US Embassy at 0300 hrs. (Note: Source arrived at the embassy by taxi.) Captured at 0700 hrs.

4. (C) Knowledgeability:

a. OB, C-10 Sapper Battalion.

b. Sapper training.

Op-3

SAU

1. Attached Embassy paper
were delivered to Col Zakarias
who made copies available to
Chief SID and Jr.

He also authorized distribution
of copies to Maj Ngia - which
was done 13 Feb.

f

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FORM DS-838
4-20-56

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF SECURITY

TITLE Nguyen Van SAU aka CHUC POW captured in the US Embassy Compound on 1/31/68 Interrogated on Feb. 9, 1968 at CMIC		CASE CLASSIFICATION
FIELD OFFICE Saigon, Vietnam	DATE REPORTED Feb. 10, 1968	DATES INVESTIGATED
		REPORTING AGENT Nguyen Van HOACH Admin. Specialist

SYNOPSIS

1. BIOGRAPHIC DATA

Nguyen Van SAU aka CHUC, born in 1937 at Vinh Loc, Giadinh, South Vietnam
 Father : Unknown
 Mother : Nguyen Thi Ut
 Not married - Illiterate (one year at elementary school).
 No identification card
 Farmer at Vinh Loc, Giadinh, South Vietnam.

2. SUMMARY OF INTERROGATION

A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

- Joined the VC in 1964. Served as a regular with the B-60 Unit, a company charged with the protection of VC VIPs, cadres and defense of the VC military command posts in the Hau Nghia area.

- Was assigned to the C-10 Unit (Dac Cong - Special Action) in 1965.
 Job: Messenger/Liaison agent.

- Was promoted Squad leader in 1966. In charge of a Messenger Squad (Tieu Doi Hoa Toe) of 8 men. Were stationed at Thanh An Market (? ...), Binh Duong.
 Functions: Mail delivery and liaison between C-10 Command (Committee) and 3 of the C-10 sub-units J-6, J-5 and J-4, all stationed in the Cu Chi district area.

APPROVED

Leo E. Crampsey - Regional Security Officer
(Special Agent in Charge)

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- 1. Col. Lenard, CMIC
- 1. OSA
- 1. Director, SMP

REVIEWED BY AGENT SUPERVISOR

(Date)

(Initials)

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The C-10 is commanded by BA TAM (South Vietnamese). The C-10 Command Post was stationed at Thanh An Market. Its members mingled with the local population.

- Affiliated to the Communist Party in March 1967

B. ATTACK AGAINST US EMBASSY, JAN. 31, 1968

On Jan. 29, 1968, Subject and 6 other men employed in the various offices (services) of C-10 (i.e. Procurement, Supply, Secretariat) namely: DUC, TEO, VAN, DAN, THANH and VINH were told to report at a location named Suoi Sau for a special mission, under command of UT NHO, a member of the C-10 Commanding Committee. In the afternoon of the same day (Jan. 29, 1968), time unknown, the seven men were picked up at Suoi Sau by BA VAN alias BA DEN, a Company rank political officer of C-10 (Description: North Vietnamese, nearly 40, short and thin, dark complexioned, wearing a blue windbreaker on the attack night. Believed to be a long time resident in South Vietnam, not a recently infiltrated Northerner). BA VAN drove them on Route # 1 direct from the Cu Chi area to Saigon where they arrived shortly after dark (between 7 and 8 p.m.). Denied the stop over and sandtable training at Go Mon as he had told a military interrogator. Claimed that such a statement had been extorted from him by torture). In Saigon, each man was dropped off at a different location. Personally, Subject was placed in house referred to as a 'garage', located in the general area of Dakao (heard BA VAN mention that name once when the latter talked to a taxidriver the following day).

The so-called garage is a one-story house situated on a main street (name unknown), next to a South Korean (or US) billet or residence guarded by Vietnamese soldiers, with a sandbagged sentinel post in front of the house. Subject was ordered to keep himself inconspicuous and was told by the house owner (name unknown) to hide himself on the upper floor. Was given 3,000 VN\$ by BA VAN; gave the house owner 500 VN\$ for food. The house was occupied by a couple. No children. Two taxicabs were parked on the ground floor. Did not talk to the house occupants.

The following day (Jan. 30, 1968), at about 9 p.m. (?), BA VAN came in a taxicab to fetch him. Subject paid 50 VN\$ for the drive. Around midnight, they went to the meeting place. It took them about half hour. The meeting place was a large house located in a dark alley. In addition to BA VAN and the 6 men already mentioned, Subject found there:

1. UT NHO, a C-10 Commanding Officer
 2. BAY HUYNH or NGUYEN, rank: Company Commander
 3. CHIN (?), another C-10 Company Commander
 4. DUONG, a C-10 Deputy Company Commander
- 12 men in all.

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Two B-40 rocket launchers (10 rockets each) and a number of AK-47 submachine guns (120 rounds of ammo each) were distributed to the men. (Exact number unknown. Several officers had side arms). At that time only, the men were briefed on their objective: They were to attack, capture and hold the US Embassy for 36 hours. They would be reinforced (or relieved) afterwards. Subject's assignment (which was the same for several of the "office workers" who had come with him) was to follow the officers into the compound, then to deploy on the East side of the Embassy building and to "defend" the entrances on that side. No explanation was given as to the purpose of such an attack. No retreat was contemplated. No hint of any inside help nor supporting fire from other units.

They left afterwards in 2 vehicles: One small truck carrying the officers and some explosives and possibly the men armed with B-40s. One taxicab transporting Subject and 4 other men, all equipped with AK 47s. Upon their arrival at the site, when they were getting off their vehicles, they received fire from an undetermined direction. The men in the leading truck blew up a hole in the enclosure then rushed in through that hole. Subject and the men in the taxi followed. They had barely penetrated the premises when Subject was hit. He believes they received fire from both the top or higher part of the building and from the vehicle gate. Subject fell (hit in the right thigh, left calf and left cheek) and did not, allegedly, have time to fire any shot. Someone took his weapons and ammo. He believed 2 other men were also hit and killed at the same time. (Possibly DUC and VAN in his group). Other men returned the fire. He dragged himself up toward the building where he took cover near one of the flower pots or structures. He claimed he then lost consciousness and recovered it only at dawn. He did at no time notice any Vietnamese civilians in white clothing (or otherwise) on the Embassy grounds. He was not aware of anyone penetrating the compound by climbing over the enclosure wall. He did not think it possible, however. He had no knowledge of any "plant" in the contiguous compound.

Subject was unable to identify any of the pictures shown to him.

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Mr. Leo E. Crampsey, RSO

10 February 1968

Richard C. Robertson, L/SY

Action Initiated Upon Information
Supplied by Nguyen Van SAU aka CHUC

Mr Mike Coughlin, Mr Nguyen Van Hoach and myself visited the Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC) yesterday morning (Feb. 9) and were permitted to interrogate Mr Nguyen Van SAU aka CHUC, born 1937, VC Squad Leader, "Urgent" Mail Squad, C-10 Sapper Unit, who was involved in the attack of the American Embassy, 4 Thong Hut, on the morning of 31 January 1968. Mr Hoach did the interrogation. (A separate report regarding the interrogation is being submitted). During the course of the interrogation, SAU revealed that he had been harbored in a garage somewhere in Saigon and that in the vicinity of this garage was a Korean Billet. SAU also vaguely remembered that the word DAKAO had been mentioned during conversations.

The writer immediately upon returning to the American Embassy, called the Combined Security Committee and requested that the Korean CSC members be contacted and requested to indicate if they had any billets in the DAKAO area. The CSC reported that the Koreans had a billet on Phan Thanh Gian street near the intersection of Dinh Tien Hoang/Phan Thanh Gian, in the heart of DAKAO. The writer then made a personal visit to the area and discovered that a Korean Billet was located near the DANG HUYNN Garage, 59 Phan Thanh Gian. After checking with Mr. Crampsey, the RSO, the writer called the CSC and the Deputy Director of the SMPD, Mr Tran Van SAT, and informed them of SAU's statement and the writer's findings. A police raid was immediately initiated by the Criminal Police Branch of the SMPD (The Special Branch being overloaded with work) and satisfactory results were obtained.

The Police first raided the Garage at 59 Phan Thanh Gian which is owned by Mrs Nguyen Thi PHE. In this garage the police found a hand written message from the LONG PHU VC Commissar named Le HUNG introducing one Miss Hai Yen to the addressee stating that she was to be provided with all assistance and that her job was to collect information and intelligence. Although this garage is owned by Mrs Nguyen Thi PHE, she sub-leased it to a Mr Huynh Ngoc CHUONG, residing at 84/11 Dinh Tien Hoang, Saigon, which is in the vicinity of the garage. A raid on this place permitted the arrest of the following persons :

Mr Huynh Ngoc CHUONG, Manager and Sub-Lessor of the DANG HUYNN Garage
** Mr Nguyen Linh, Airborne Lieutenant
Mr Huynh Ngoc Dinh, son of Chuong
Mr Huynh Ngoc Son, policeman, SMPD, son of Chuong
Mr Phan Phan
Mr Nguyen Van Ut
Miss Tran Ngoc Thuy
Mr Nguyen Van Thuoc
Mr Tran Xuan Khiem, Cadet
Mr Nguyen Van Day

Mrs Nguyen Thi FHE has already confessed that on the evening of the 30th of January 1968, around 1800 hours, one Ba TUAN, a VC cadre, called at her garage on a motorbike and requested that she harbor a number of VCs. Later that evening, about 12 to 15 VCs fully armed, arrived in vehicles and stayed at her house until 2300 hours. Shortly after 2300 hours, they all departed in vehicles for an unknown destination. It should be noted that Mrs FHE is the interfamily Chief of her Ward.

** Lt. Nguyen Linh, who was arrested in CHUONG's house, was found to be carrying a MAP indicating where ARVN Units were located.

Deputy Director SAT, SAMPD, stated that all these suspects have been turned over to the Special Branch, SAMPD, for further exploitation. Mr SAT also stated that we have "Carte Blanche" and that Capt. TAN of the Special Branch has been told to provide this office with all information on this case.

RRobertson:der

Team # 4 ? 2 South/Rodgers
Col. Jacobson, Mission Coordinator

Report FM US EMBASSY

NGUYEN VAN SAW,
captured 31 Jan February 68

According to preliminary interrogation of VC prisoners, specifically, two Company Commanders of the 6th VC LP Battalion (165-A Regiment) and a Political Commissar from this Regiment, revealed the following information which might be of some use to your office :

- 1.- Between 25 to 30 battalions were to have been used for attacking Saigon and Giadin
- 2.- The VC Forces were training one month in advance for this attack
- 3.- The main targets were to be : The Radio Station
The Chi Hoa Prison ?
Suburban Police Stations
Tan Son Nhut Airport
- 4.- Their missions were to occupy specified targets and hold these positions until reinforcements arrived. They were absolutely forbidden to withdraw.
- 5.- Weapons and equipment : Each sub-machine gun 500 rounds ? 200-250
Each B-40 rocket launcher 7 rounds
Each B-41 rocket launcher 5 rounds
Each RBD (Heavy machinegun) 1500 rounds
Each AA Gun, 2500 rounds
- Each VC soldier was to carry on him either one B-40 or B-41 rocket. ?
- 6.- Those injured or killed were to be treated and left behind
- 7.- They were only to take one day's food with them. They were to find and get food on the spot. (They were told according to VC POWs that the people would uprising, support them and provide them with food)
- 8.- Several North Vietnamese Units were to have participated in the attack. ?
- 9.- The mission of the 6th Battalion, 165-A Regiment was to occupy the CHI HOA Prison. However, it didn't. Instead it moved to the general area of AN QUANG Pagoda. The route used to infiltrate Saigon was :
Please study this unit and reply with what states

TAN NHUT - TAN KIEN - AN LOC - PHU THO HOA and SAIGON CITY.

- 10.- The red arm bands of the 6th Battalion read as follows " X2-A6" ?
Other arms bands found on VC bodies were :
"X2-B61" "X2-B62" "X2-B27" and "X3 ?"
These units have not been identified yet. *appeared in newspaper*

PS : According to statements made by VCs to the people in the general area of the AN QUANG Pagoda, General TRAN VAN TRA, the Present C-in-C of VC Forces in South Vietnam (he replaced Nguyen Chi Thanh who was killed) was directing the ~~attack~~ Liberation Forces.

RCRobertson: dcr

#1 OK - agree

#2 Training 3 days - one before

#3 OK - agree

Radio Station - 2 plts attacked

TSN - two Bns confirmed by PWs
probably 5 or 6 Bns.

#4 OK - no units w/ withdrawal plans.

#5 a) average 750 rounds

b) ~~3~~ average 3-4 "

c) average 2-3 "

d) OK

e) OK

#6 - OK no comment

#7 carried varied amts food depending how
far to move. Food obtained by taking it
from local people.

#8 negative - no NVA units

#9 6th Bn is independent local force element.
didn't want to occupy, but just free prisoner

#10 - no idea on significance

#11 - questionable

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Subject: Interrogation of PW from the C-10 Sapper Unit.

To: US Director, CMIC

1. Background Information : This report contains information which was collected while sitting on an interrogation conducted by three members of the US Embassy on PW NGUYEN VAN SAU, who was captured following the attack on the US Embassy on 31 Jan 68.

2. Biographical Data: Source, NGUYEN VAN SAU (NGUYEN VAN SAUS) was assigned to the C-10 Sapper Unit in 1965. He served as a squad leader for a messenger squad.

3. Mission: On 29 Jan 68 Source and five other low ranking men were selected from the C-10 Sapper Unit to go on an operation with six other High ranking Members of the C-10 Unit. At this time source did not know the objective of the operation. On the night of 30 Jan 68 the 12 men were picked up by truck at a location known to the source only as SOUI SAU. During the night each man was taken to a civilian house located in Saigon where he was to remain until being called for the following night. Only one man was taken to each house. Source stayed in a house with a Vietnamese man and woman. The house contained a two car garage and was located next to a Korean billets. During the night of 31 Jan 68, two taxi cabs came and picked up the men. Source still had no idea where he was, but the cadre were very knowledgeable of the roads that were traveled. The two taxis then pulled into a dark alley and the men were taken into a large house and told that they were going to attack the US Embassy. They were told that their objective was to penetrate the wall with B-40's and hold the embassy for 36 hours at which time they would be relieved. The men were then driven by two taxis to the embassy wall. They got out of the taxi and blew a hole in the wall through which the other men entered. At this time the source who was the third man through the wall, was injured and could supply no further details on the attack. He layed on the embassy premise until morning when he was captured.

4. Weapons Used:

- a. 2 B-40 rocket launchers
- b. 10 AK's # 47 with 120 rounds each

5.

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5. Miscellaneous: Source stated that ^{he knew of} there was no previous planning for the attack ^{or} and that no inside help was used in conducting the attack. There also was no withdrawal plan from the embassy.

John A. Turnicky
John A. Turnicky
Sp 4 MI

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1. 1 PW - NGUYỄN VĂN ĐÀU, aka CHỨC,
Sgd Ltr, C.10 Sapper Unit.

2. Circumstances of Capture: On 31 Jan 68
a sapper element organized an attack
on the US Embassy on TONG NHAT Blvd.
After occupying the Embassy, the group
was counter attacked by US Forces, and
source was wounded and captured. All
other personnel were KIA.

3. Information Obtained:

a. Attack on the US Embassy on the night
of 31 Jan 68:

(1) Units Participating: A newly organized
sapper element of C.10 with a strength of
16 men

armed w/ 2 B.40 RL's, 7 AK 546's, and
2 Colt pistols (VS. 45 cal)

(2) Preparations: The unit had only a
a basic load of ammunition and no
other supplies. They were told by
UT NHO, a cadre of C.10, that a
vehicle from a friendly (VC) unit
would arrive at the embassy on
the following morning with a
resupply of ammo as well as food
and other supplies.

Prior to the attack, the unit
was informed by cadre that after
occupying the embassy, US forces

would certainly launch a counter attack. "Other" units were to reinforce in the morning.

b. Route of Approach:

(1) On 28 Jan 68, the group moved from their base area in PHU HOA Dist, BINH DUONG Prov to a jungle area near BINH KY Val (XT 800123), HOC MON Dist, GIA DINH Prov. Here they met UT NHO, a Co CO of C. 10 Unit, for small training.

(2) At approx 301800 hrs Jan 68, 4 local force personnel of GO MON Dist (NOTE: GO MON is VC Dist composed

of GVN GO VAP and HOC MON Districts,
GIA DINH Prov. guided the unit from
BINH KY Vil to SAIGON along small
dirt and paved roads. At approx
310100 hrs Jan 68, they arrived at
Natl Hwy 1 in vic BA QUEO (267th) (X5789955)
where they rested and waited for 2
Taxis which brought UT NHO and
3 other men (one of whom was CHIN, XO
of source's element). The entire party
then proceeded to the embassy in
the taxis.

c. Conduct of the battle:

The 2 taxis took the VC from

the BA QUFO area to SAIGON. When they arrived at the embassy, the train stopped and the VC deployed. They blew a hole in the fence with the B.40's and penetrated the grounds.

Afterwards, US Forces counter attacked and by 0600 hrs, source was wounded and captured and all other VC were KIA.

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COMBINED
MILITARY INTERROGATION REPORT
INTERROGATION
CENTER

mm

Additional requirements for levy on subject source should be relayed immediately to MACV J2, IOD, referencing CMIC source number

1828

COUNTRY: RVN
SUBJECT: Organization of the C-10 Sapper Battalion
DATE OF INFORMATION: 30 Jan 68
PLACE OF ACQUISITION: CMIC, SAIGON
EVALUATION: SOURCE - E INFORMATION 6
SOURCE: Captive, NGUYEN VAN SAU (NGUYENX, VEAN SAUS), aka CHUC (CHUCS);
CMIC # 1828
REPORT NUMBER: US 383-68
DATE OF REPORT: 23 Feb 68
NUMBER OF PAGES: Four (4)
REFERENCES: MACV ICP
PREPARED BY: M GREGG, 1LT, US Army

SUMMARY: This report contains information on the structure of the C-10 Sapper Battalion, to include background on the source, as provided by captive, NGUYEN VAN SAU, a Sqd Ldr in the Administrative Section of the C-10 Sapper Bn. Source was captured on 31 Jan 68.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

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1. Background Information.

Source joined the VC in May 64. He received one month of training, which included marksmanship and infantry tactics. He was assigned to B-60 (subordinated to the SAIGON, GIA DINH Zone) in Jun 64. From Jun 64 to Sep 65, source performed engineer tasks with B-60. These tasks included the building of houses and the setting up of camps. In Sep 65, he was assigned to C-10 for three months sapper training. Source, along with 100 others, studied the uses of mines and explosives. They also studied methods of penetrating barbed wire defense and of disarming mines and explosives. After his sapper training was completed, he was assigned to B-10, a ten-man sapper unit operating in the CU CHI area. Source remained with B-10 from Jan 66 to Aug 66. In Aug 66, he was assigned to the Admin Section of the C-10 Bn.

2. Organization. (See Inclosure)

Source stated that he knew of only four operating units and three staff units in the C-10 Bn. The Admin Sect was the source's unit. It was responsible for messenger service and handled money for the battalion. There were 14 people who worked in this section. Source was a Sqd Ldr in messenger work, having delivered the messages from the military staff to the various operating (J) units. He claimed that he did not know the contents of these messages. The only information provided by source on the Military Staff Sect and the Political Sect was that they had approx 15 and 10 members respectively.

3. Personalities:

a. Cadre of C-10 Bn:

CO: BA TAM (BA, TAN)

XO: BAY SON (BAY, SOWN)

PO: TU QUY (TUW, QUY)

Asst PO: BA HAI (BA, HAI)

NOTE: None of the cadre have ranks.

b. Cadre of the J units of the C-10 Bn:

J-4 Ldr: TU TANG (TUW, TEANG)

J-5 Ldr: BA TAM (BA, TAM)

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J-6 Ldr: TAM BEN (TAM, BEENL)

J-9 Ldr: BA VAN (BA, VAAN)

Admin Sect Ldr: HA SUONG (HA, SUOWNG)

4. Weapons of the Admin Sect:

Four AK-47s

Two SMG's

One B-40 ATGL


5. Location of the Admin Sect. Source stated that his unit was stationed in THANH AN VIL, DAU TIENG Dist, BINH DUONG Prov (No further details.)

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Organization of C-10 Sapper Battalion, as provided by captive, NGUYEN VAN SAU (NGUYENK, VEAN SAUS);
CMIC #1828. (DOI: 30 Jan 68)

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PUBLISHED

15.2.68

KB FORMAT

1. (C) Biographical Data:

CMIC # 1828

- a. Name: NGUYEN VAN SAU (NGUYEENX VEAN SAUS)
- b. Alias: CHUC (CHUCWS)
- c. Rank: Sqd Ldr
- d. VC/NVA unit of assignment and duties: ~~Sqd Ldr~~, Administrative Section, C 10 Bn
- e. DPOB: DINH LOT VIL, TAN BINH Dist, GIA DINH Prov, RVN ~~DOB~~ 1937,
- f. HOR: Same as POB
- g. Education: 5 months
- h. Political Affiliations: None
- i. MARSTA: Single
- j. Total military Service: 3 1/2 years
- k. Relatives working for RVN or RVNAF: None
- l. Relatives working for VC or NVA: None
- m. Religion: Buddhist

2. (C) Circumstances of ~~Return~~/Capture:

- a. When: 31 Jan 68
- b. Where: American Embassy, SAIGON
- c. Returned to/Captured by: US Forces
- d. Documents or weapons in possession: ^(G) One AK rifle.

3. (C) Past Activities:

- 1937-Apr 1964 Lived at native village with parents and helped family as a farmer
- May 1964 Joined VC in native village
- Jun 1964-Jul 1964 Received basic infantry training at PHU HOA VIL, CU CHI Dist, HAU NGHIA Prov.
- Aug 1964-Aug 1965 Assigned to B-60 Plat, C-10 Bn at CU CHI as a soldier.
- Sep 1965-Dec 1965 Transferred to 4th Sqd, 2 Plat, C-10 Bn at CU CHI and received three months advanced training on Sqd, Plat, and Co size attacks and defenses and sapper training.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

NOTE: Infrastructure OB + location

3. (C) Past Activities cont

Dec 1965-Jun 1966 Assigned as Sqd Ldr, B10 Sqd, C-10 Bn. at CU CHI

Jul 1966-Jan 1968 Assigned to the Administration Section, C-10 Bn in
DAU TIEN Dist, BINH DUONG Prov as Sqd Ldr. His section
was responsible for correspondence.

26 Jan 1968-27 Jan 1968 Left DAU TIEN and walked to CU CHI. At CU CHI got a small
bus and came to SAIGON on 27 Jan 1968.

28 Jan 1968-30 Jan 1968 Stayed at a house in DAKAO (SAIGON) for two days.

31 Jan 1968 Took a taxi to the US Embassy and attacked the embassy
at 3:00 AM. Source was captured at 7:00 AM.

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4. (C) Knowledgeability:

OB of C-10 Bn

Administrative Section C10 Bn

~~Attack on US Embassy~~

5. (C) Interrogator's Comments:

- a. Physical condition: Poor (was wounded on left cheek and right buttock)
- b. Cooperation: Below average
- c. Intelligence: Average

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

INDICATOR QUESTIONNAIRE
From 1 Feb to 29 Feb 68

SOURCE NAME <u>NGUYEN VAN SAU</u>	CMIC # _____
VC <u>X</u> <u>NVA</u> CHECK ONE	DATE OF INTERROGATION <u>12 Feb 68</u>
RANK or POSITION <u>Sqd Ldr</u>	PLACE <u>CMIC SAIGON</u>
UNIT <u>C-10 Bn</u>	

1. Instructions for the interrogator.

A. Fill in above data pertaining to source.

Before the interrogation begins, every source will first be asked the questions listed below to determine selected exploitable areas. The source response will be indicated by writing "yes" or "no" at the end of each question. After all the questions have been asked the normal interrogation will begin. When the interrogator returns to CMIC, the complete list along with the KB will be turned over to the KB section.

I. Questions to be asked.

- No A. Can you provide locations where weapons are being produced in NVN or SVN?
- No B. Do you know where there are VC/NVA POL dumps?
- No C. Are you familiar with the HANOI, HAIPHONG, BAC GIANG, NAM BINH, or DO SON area? Have you ever been on a n airfiled in NVN?..
- No D. Have you ever seen any foriegn pilots or soldiers, other than American or its allies, in NVN?
- No E. Did you ever work with Signal equipment or recieve Signal training?
- No F. Do you know anything about VC/NVA Medicine or Hospitals?
- No G. Do you know of a US Doughnut shaped spike trap?
- No H. Have you ever heard of a VC/NVA frogman, or naval sapper training site?
- No I. Have you heard of, or know of, any type of AA weapons or VC/NVA missiles in NVN, SVN, LAOS, or CAMBODIA?, If so, does source know the locations of the sites? Source know of details about VC/NVA AAA or Arty weapons?
- No J. H ave you ever been in an Air Attack? When? What type of Air Craft?
- No K. Did you receive prior warning of an air attack? Are there certain areas where you can go to be safe from air attacks?
- No L. Does source have any knowledge of Opium production in NVN?
- No M. Have you heard anything about the VC/NVA bringing more troops to the SAIGON, BIEN HOA area?
- No N. Did you infiltrate through (1) DMZ (2) LAOS (3) CAMBODIA?
- No O. Have you ever helped to evacuate the wounded or to bury the dead?
- No P. Do you have any knowledge of the SAIGON, CHOLON, GIA DINH Special sector Com.
- No Q. Have you ever observed American piolet POWs or American or 3rd country detainees in NVN, SVN, LAOS, or CAMBODIA? If so or yes, Where? When? How many?
- No R. Does source have any knowledge of supply routes? Does source know of any routes by which weapons enter NVN/SVN from USSR, COMMUNIST CHINA, or EAST GERMANY?
- No S. Do you speak or understand any language other than Vietnamese?
- No T. Does source have any knowledge of Resoiation 13?
- No U. Do you know of any intelligence organizations being operated by the VC?
- No V. Do the VC/NVA attempt to salvage equipment, medical, food or other supplies from bombed supply caches? to what extent?

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

- W. Do the VC/NVA locate base camps in areas which have already been bombed, because they think that the area will not be bombed again?
No
- X. Does source have any knowledge of North Koreans or other 3rd country personnel in SVN?
No
- Y. Have you ever heard of the "Capital Defense Division" in NVN?
No
- Z. Did you ever belong to the NVA Militia and/or Reserve forces?
No
- AA. Have you ever used the Chicom 702 Radio? Can you describe the Chicom 702?
No
- BB. Does source know of any activity or advisors from USSR, COMMUNIST CHINA, NORTH KOREA, or any other third country in RVN/NVN/LAOS/CAMBODIA/THAILAND.
No
- CC. Have you ever seen copies of HIEH NAM TU DO?
No
- DD. Does source have any knowledge of VC/NVA drugs (i.g. Opium, Marijuana, Heroin Etc.), before, during or after battles?
No
- EE. Have you ever seen aircraft? Was this during battle? What were you instructed to do, to avoid being seen?
No
- FF. Do you know who the leaders of the NVN Air Force are?
No
- GG. Have you ever heard anything about a Military Affairs Committee MRI?
No
- HH. Does source have any knowledge of NVA/VC caches?
No
- II. Does source have any knowledge of Night tactics (battles, Ambush, Training and actual)?
YES
- JJ. Does source have any knowledge of the "School of the Communist Party of Thailand", in particular the school located at HOA BINH, NVN?
No
- KK. Does source have any knowledge of Explosives, Mines, Boobytraps?
No
- LL. Does source have knowledge of supply system or training facilities in the RUNG SAT Special zone?
No
- MM. Have you come in contact with the US HK-36 destructor?
No
- NN. Does source have any knowledge of pending US/Allied operations?
No
- OO. Does source have any knowledge of VC/NVA operations pending?
No
- PP. Does source have knowledge of the use of Military Trucks in SVN by VC/NVA?
No
- QQ. Did source have any food at time of his or her capture? If yes, type of food and the amount.
No
- RR. Does source know anything about the GVN (RVN) policy of releasing VC/NVA POWs during Holiday periods?
No
- SS. Does source know anything about the VC/NVA policy of killing US or Allied wounded on the battlefield?
No
- TT. Does source know anything about dissident and/or resistance groups or movement in NVN directed against NVN government, especially the SACRED SWORD PATRIOTS LEAGUE?
No
- UU. Did source have new weapon at time of Capture or Return?
YES (1966)
- VV. What was source's infiltration unit designation?
No



