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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 377TH COMBAT SUPPORT GROUP (PACAF)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307



UNCLASSIFIED

12 January 1970

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: BC

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: PAF-Y1)

2240(4)

to: Directorate of Security Police (IGS) 7AF

1. (U) Name and Identification and/or Type of Operation: 122mm Rocket Attack on Tan Son Nhut Air Base, RVN.

2. (U) Time and Date: 0241, 19 December 1969

3. (U) Location: Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Quan Tsui Binh and Go Vap Districts, approximately 4 miles northwest of the center of Saigon, RVN.

4. (U) Control or Command Headquarters: Joint Defense Operations Center, Tan Son Nhut Sensitive Area.

5. (C) Task Organizations:

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OF DoD Reg-5200 1-R
BY Dee Harper ON 17 JAN 77

- a. 2nd Services Battalion (ARVN)
- b. 3rd Ranger Group (ARVN)
- c. 5th Ranger Group (ARVN)
- d. 377th Security Police Squadron
- e. Augmentation Forces, 377th Combat Support Group
- f. Augmentation Forces, Tenant U.S. Army Units
- g. 1st Platoon Armed Helicopter, 120th Aviation Company, LPT's from USARV.
- h. 1st Composite Rifle Company, 33rd VNAF Wing Defense Group, JDOC
- i. 1st Tank Platoon, 33rd VNAF Wing Defense Group, JDOC
- j. VNAF and 7th AF TACC
- k. Tan Son Nhut Sensitive Area Advisory Team

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6. (U) Unit Commanders Engaged in Operations:

- a. Commander, 33rd VNAF Wing; Colonel Phan Phung Tien
- b. Commander, 2nd Services Battalion; Major Ngo Van Triem

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- c. Commander, TSN Sensitive Area; Colonel Phan Phung Tien
- d. Commander, 377th Combat Support Group; Colonel Frank E. Marek
- e. Advisor AFAT #1, 33rd Wing; Colonel Sineor Hunt
- f. Senior Advisor TSN Sensitive Area; Major Kurt S. Petersen
- g. Commander, 377th Security Police Squadron; Lt Col Roger P. Fox
- h. Commander MACV Annex; Lt Col George W. Dickerson
- i. Commander Armed Helicopter Platoon, 120th Aviation Company;
Capt Fred L. Evors
- j. 821st Combat Scty Pol Sq/B Flight; Capt Michael J. Creedon

7. (C) Security Police Status:

a. There were 364 Security Policemen (811X0) and two officers on duty when the attack was initiated. The total PFD strength, including Safeside, was 720 (811X0) personnel and 10 officers. There were over fifty (50%) percent of the PFD on duty at the start of the attack and the remainder were recalled and posted.

b. There were 430 Air Force augmentees plus 4 platoons of U.S. Army (approximately 100 men) alerted and placed on stand-by.

8. (C) Intelligence:

a. During the period 3 December thru 19 December 1969, intelligence reports showed an increase in enemy movement and terrorism within a 30 km radius of the installation. Also enemy initiated incidents increased within III Corps Area of operation during this period.

b. Armament of enemy units engaged, sighted and/or reported on was individual weapons, B-40 rockets, and mortars. No reports indicated the presence of 122mm rockets. However, on 17 Dec 69 at 0040 hours, one 122mm rocket impacted on the downtown section of Saigon.

c. Intelligence reports the day preceding the attack indicated that enemy activities, mostly stand-off attacks, would increase during the period 19 thru 22 Dec 69. The high point of this period would be 19 Dec 69 with an all out offensive in memory of the National Liberation Front Activation Day, which began on 19 Dec 1946.

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9. (C) Execution: At 0241, 19 December 1969 a Security Policeman in an observation tower reported incoming rockets directed toward the base. The warning siren, Giant Voice and Radio "Lone Star" were activated. Security Alert Condition Red (Option I) was implemented. At 0321, all QRT's and additional posts required by Security Alert Condition Red (Option I) were manned. At 0327 all augmentee personnel were armed, equipped, and placed on stand-by. At 0434, the Security Alert Condition was downgraded to YELLOW and at 0544 Security Alert Condition WHITE was implemented. A total of four rockets impacted on the southern portion of the installation. Two hit in the Vietnamese housing area, one at the U.S. Army Heliport, and one in the 69th Signal Company (U.S. Army) compound.

10. (C) Results:

a. U.S. and Free World Forces

- (1) KIA: None
- (2) WIA: Five U.S. Army personnel
- (3) MIA: None
- (4) Aircraft Destroyed: None
- (5) Aircraft Damaged: None
- (6) Facilities/Material Damaged/Destroyed: One building destroyed, two buildings minor damage, and three vehicles minor damage in 69th Signal Company compound. Minor damage to passenger lounge at U.S. Army Heliport.

b. Enemy:

- (1) KIA: Unknown
- (2) CIA: None
- (3) WIA: Unknown
- (4) Equipment and Material Losses: Unknown

11. (U) Administrative Matters: Written plans and directives were adequate. No problem areas were noted during the attack concerning supply, weapons, transportation, or communications.

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12. (U) Special Equipment and Techniques:

- a. Friendly: No special equipment or techniques employed.
- b. Enemy: No special equipment or techniques employed.

13. (C) Evaluation of Overall Operations: The overall evaluation of the operation concerning alertness, notification procedures, response time, and posting of Security Policemen were outstanding.

Frank E. Marek
FRANK E. MAREK, Colonel, USAF
Commander

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- 1. Map of Rocket Impact Area (C)
- 2. Damage Photos (11)

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