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IGS

4 MAR 1967

Combat Operations After Actions Report, Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN
4 Dec 66, RCS: MACV J3-32 (U)

DO
DPL
IN TURN

[Handwritten notes: NAME 6-1-67]

1. (U) The attached report is forwarded for your information (Atch 1).
2. (C) (C) It is our opinion that this attack is a "typical" Viet Cong combined mortar and sapper penetration attack which can be staged at any time against USAF and USAF/VNAF installations. From it we can evaluate our security concept of operations.
 - a. (U) We feel that the threat against USAF and USAF/VNAF installations as defined in PACAF Supplement to AFM 207-1 is accurate.
 - b. (C) We feel that the existing security standards as established in PACAF and 7AF supplements to AFM 207-1 provide at least the minimum security required to cope with the threat.
3. (U) Problem areas discussed in paragraphs 14 and 15 are being pursued with Hq 7AF (Atch 2).
4. (U) Please return report to IGS.

SIGNED

JACK H. McCREERY, Colonel, USAF
Deputy Inspector General

- 2 Atch
1. 377CSG Ltr, 25 Dec 66, w/6 Atch, (S N/F) (1 cy)
 2. IGS Ltr to 7AF (C) (1 cy)

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CLASSIFIED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DD FORM 5200.10

UPON WITHDRAWAL OF THE ATTACHMENT
HEREWITH, THIS CORRESPONDENCE MAY
BE DECLASSIFIED TO
(UNCLASSIFIED) IAW AFR 205-1

apt Altieri/IGS/3-44193/rdc

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[REDACTED]

IGS

Combat Operations After Actions Report, Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN,
4 Dec 66, RGS: MACV J3-32 (U)

7AF (IGS)

1. (U) The subject report is considered to be the most informative, comprehensive, and complete one received to date. The lessons learned from this attack can be extremely useful in the identification of problem areas, improvement of defensive tactics, and the identification of needed equipment.

2. (C) (U) Our review prompted the following comments:

a. (U) Reference paragraph 13b(2): If security information other than that contained in OPlan 207-XX is included in the Joint US Forces Defense Plan 1-66, recommend this headquarters be included in the distribution of the plan.

b. (U) Reference paragraph 14a: In the cases where the sentry dogs were released against attacking VC, can the effectiveness of the dogs be evaluated? Was there evidence that the dogs actually attacked the VC?

c. (C) Reference paragraph 14c: PACAF (DM) indicates that there is no "Unsatisfactory Report" (UR) on record for the Shotgun, Model 77, 12 Gage Stevens Pump (Savage). Recommend you follow up on this item since this is the cause of delay in replacement of this unsatisfactory weapon.

d. (U) Reference paragraph 14d: PACAF (DM) indicates that two shipments of 700 CAR-15 sub-machine guns each were scheduled for delivery in RVN in January and February 1967.

e. (U) Reference paragraph 14e: Since a bayonet is authorized for the M-16, what action is being taken to acquire them at TSN and at other bases?

f. (U) Reference paragraph 15g: This headquarters recognizes the problem of vegetation control in RVN; however, it is obvious that increased emphasis on this subject is required. What action do you contemplate?

[REDACTED]

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

[REDACTED]

j. (U) Reference paragraph 15m: Has the cause of the jamming of the weapon on Post 15 been determined? Was it a common malfunction or a deficiency in that particular weapon?

h. (U) From the lessons learned from this attack, do you recommend any changes to existing security standards, procedures, or equipment?

i. (U) As a result of this attack, has there been any change in the overall defense posture for Tan Son Nhut AB?

3. (U) Request reply by 10 March 1967.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

SIGNED

JAMES D. OTIS, JR., Colonel, USAF
Director of Security Police
Office of the Inspector General

IGS

James D. Otis, Jr.
14
DMS ES
CHANNI
1 Feb 67